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IN THE UTAH COURT Or APPEALS 
DEE HENSH AVI, ) 
) BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) IRENE SWEENEY 
vc~ ) 
) Appeal No. 950078-CA 
UTAH DEPARTME:., r ) 
TRANSPORTATION. a political ) 
subdivision of the State of ) 
Utah, and TREN^ SWEENEY, ) 
Defendants/Appellees. ) 
*^~ ISD1CTJ.U* 
This appeal was initially filed Jn the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant * '" -' Joue Ar-. (Mir-tiin 19 9?! & 
Supp. lyyi.) , .._ , .. « , o^iir1" c: Appea i J ix^ o jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant * ~ l:i /;: Code An:.. § "8 2-2(4) (Michie 1392 
& Supp. 19:94) . 
S T A T E M E M T C F I S S U E S XH2 S T A N D A R D 0 F REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review on this 
appeal: 
1 Did the district court correctly conclude that 
there was no issue of material fact as to when 
Appellant's causes of action against Appellee 
Irene Sweeney arose? 
233X74055.1 
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2. Did the district court correctly conclude that 
Appellant's claims against Appellee Irene 
Sweeney were barred by the relevant statutes of 
limitations? 
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the facts 
and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1188, 1192 (Utah 1993). Questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 provides: 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action has accrued, except in specific 
cases where a different limitation is prescribed 
by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 provides: 
Within six years: 
(2) An action upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 provides: 
Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
233\74055 1 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. .aiuiL, wi ase 
Tins case involves a dispute over the sale of a 
parcel c: **• •] property in Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake ?^ inr-
* - ; opei ty") Appel] ai r • - -..-s 
and Appellee Irene Sweeney ("Sweeney""; entered into an 
executory Uniform Real Estate Centra-"- :r>-~. M^or.trar* " ~^r rne 
.
L
-' - -l->:" : - i 
had previously been deeded to Sweeney by Appellee Utah 
Department of Transportat i <v "UDOT"), and other portions were 
d e t r a - . s. I: :i :i i 
Appellant contends that UDOT did not have clear title 
• - ""he py-^ p^ -K-r deeded * 9ween~\ d which Sweeney 
JO::-. . , •• . _..\^  .'IL^ -^-L^ - Appellant asserts that 
beginning . n . ,. >• ]v8:-, Sweeney refused to accept payments 
under the Contract. He furt~:~—~ ----i1- j1 "•• • *—-iqrned 
the Contract and transferred the riop^Ly ^ ;D^r wiLnout 
notice to Appellant. Appellant claims that he repeatedly 
tendered r^ vm^ -r- for the Pre :"•* •"' ' •.'••-•' --. '. 
Appe ,-._... .ncjaes, however, that lie was aavisec .in March 1986 
that Sweeney had transferred the Property t :• UDOT. He further 
a dm i t s t h at he obtained c'i«""^  M e r t y b \ » w a i r a i 11 > 
deed from UDOT i n August . .
 t.. 
233V74055.1 
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B. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
1. On or about May 27, 1976, Appellant and Sweeney 
entered into the Contract for the purchase of certain real 
property located in Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. (R. at 53 1 10). 
2. Appellant alleges that at the time Sweeney 
executed the Contract she was aware that she did not have clear 
title to all the Property to be conveyed under the Contract. 
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Sweeney intentionally 
misrepresented to him that she had clear title to the Property 
and had the power and ability to convey the Property to him by 
means of a warranty deed. (Id. at 59 ^ 43-45) . 
3. All or part of the Property subject to the 
Contract had previously been deeded to Sweeney by UDOT, but 
UDOT did not have clear title to such property. (Id. at 54 ^| 
13-14) . 
4. In July 1985, Appellant tendered to Sweeney all 
payments due under the Contract, but Sweeney refused to accept 
such payments and failed to provide Appellant with a warranty 
deed and title insurance to the Property. (.Id. at 54, 58 
UK 16-17; Brief of Appellant at 37-39) . 
5. On or about November 21, 1985, Sweeney assigned 
her interest in the Contract to UDOT. UDOT informed Appellant 
of this assignment in March 1986. (Id. at 54-55 UH 18-19). 
233X74055 1 
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6. In March 1986, Appellant began dealing 
exclusively with UDOT with respect to payment obligations under 
the Contract. He asserts that UDOT thereafter failed and 
refused to accept his tenders or to deed the Property by 
warranty deed to him until August 1991. (Id. at 55-56 11 20-
24) . 
7. Appellant obtained clear title to the Property 
by warranty deed from UDOT in or about August 1991. (Ld. at 56 
1 24) . 
8. Appellant commenced this action by filing his 
Complaint on or after January 28, 1992. (.Id. at 19). 
9. On March 27, 1992, Sweeney filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. at 74-76). On March 31, 
1993, the District Court dismissed with prejudice Appellant's 
Complaint as to Sweeney. (R. at 218-22). 
10. On October 25, 1994, Appellant filed his Notice 
of Appeal. (R. at 594-95). 
11. On March 1, 1995, Appellant filed its brief with 
the Utah Supreme Court of Appeals. This appeal was transferred 
to the Utah court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues on appeal that the District Court 
erred in concluding he initiated this action outside the 
relevant limitation periods for his claims against Sweeney. He 
233\74055 1 
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further argues that Sweeney should be estopped from asserting 
the statute of limitation because she concealed facts necessary 
to put Appellant on notice of his cause of action. 
Additionally, he argues that the District Court erred as a 
matter of law in holding that the relevant statutes of 
limitation were not tolled by Appellant's failure to discover 
his injury. 
Appellant's arguments are without merit. Appellant's 
own statements indicate that any breach of contract or fraud 
alleged by Appellant arose in July, 1985. Consequently, 
Appellant brought his actions outside the relevant limitations 
periods. Moreover, the District Court correctly concluded that 
the "discovery rule" did not apply in this case for at least 
two reasons. First, Appellant concedes that he was aware of 
any injury during the relevant limitation period. Second, in 
light of the facts presented, Appellant failed to act 
reasonably in investigating his claim and protecting his 
rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT NO 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The date of Sweeney's alleged breach of 
contract is not in dispute 
On appeal, Appellant asserts that Sweeney's breach of 
the Contract did not occur until March 1986, when he claims 
that UDOT informed him of Sweeney's assignment of the Contract 
233X74055 1 _ 
to UDOT. (Brief of Appellant at 32-34.) This argument, 
rejected by the trial court, is directly contrary to the 
evidence, including Appellant's own sworn statements. 
In his Amended Complaint, Appellant alleges that 
"beginning in June of 1985" he repeatedly tendered to Sweeney 
the balance owing under the Contract for the purchase of the 
Property. (R. at 54 K 15). Appellant further alleges 
"beginning in July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept 
[Appellant's] payments on the property and would not discuss a 
payoff with the [Appellant.]" (Id. at 59 f 16). 
After Sweeney raised the statute of limitations, 
Appellant backtracked by asserting that Sweeney "never actually 
stated that she would not accept a final payoff" of the 
Contract balance. (Xd. at 102.) Appellant's statements are, 
however, hopelessly inconsistent. In the same memorandum in 
which he claims Sweeney never stated she would not accept final 
payoff, he also states that in approximately July of 1985, 
Sweeney refused to accept payments under the Contract, and that 
by August or September of 1985, Sweeney would not even discuss 
the Property with Appellant. (Id. at 99-100). These 
allegations are buttressed by Appellant's sworn affidavit, 
submitted with the Memorandum. (Affidavit of Dee Henshaw, 
April 10, 1992, R. at 114-115A). 
In addition to being internally inconsistent, 
Appellants assertions are immaterial and do not indicate error 
233X74055 1 
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by the District Court. Appellant confuses the issues of when 
the breach occurred, and when Appellant allegedly discovered 
the breach. Appellant admits that in March 1986 UDOT informed 
him that Sweeney had assigned the Contract and transferred the 
Property to UDOT. (R. at 55, 100 % 15, 115 HH 9-11). At most, 
however, this fact indicates when Appellant learned of the 
breach, not when the breach actually occurred. The breach 
occurred when Sweeney refused to accept payments and discuss 
the Property with Appellant, and the statute of limitation 
began to run at that time. Appellant's statements regarding 
what he heard from UDOT in March 1986 are immaterial to the 
question of when the alleged breach of contract occurred. 
For example, the essential material facts, which are 
not in dispute, are that by August or September of 1985, 
Appellant knew that Sweeney would not accept payments under the 
Contract and, in fact, would not even discuss the Property with 
Appellant. Even taking these facts in the light most favorable 
to Appellant, the inescapable conclusion is that any alleged 
breach of the Contract must have occurred by that time. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the date of 
Sweeney's alleged breach of the Contract. 
233\74055 1 
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B. There is no dispute as to the date 
Appellant's alleged cause of action for 
fraud accrued 
Appellant also claims that his cause of action for 
fraud is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), because he did not 
discover until the Spring of 1991 that Sweeney did not have 
clear title to the Property.1 Once again, however, Appellant 
relies upon the assertion of immaterial facts and assumptions 
in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. 
A cause of action for fraud accrues when the 
plaintiff knows, or has reason to know the facts constituting 
the fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3); see also Loveridge v. 
Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Utah 
law). Appellant's claim that he did not know until 1991 that 
Sweeney did not have clear title to the Property is completely 
untenable in light of the facts of this case. 
Appellant could have discovered in 1976 that Sweeney 
did not have clear title to the Property. A prudent purchaser 
would have discovered the clouded title upon examining the 
records in the county recorder's office. Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188, 1195-96 (Utah 1993); McConkie v. Hartman, 529 
P.2d 801, 801-02 (Utah 1974). Appellant could have discovered 
again in 1979 that Sweeney did not have clear title to the 
Henshaw's claims regarding the applicability of the 
"discovery rule" to his fraud claim is discussed in greater 
detail in Section II, infra. 
233\74055 1 
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Property. It was in 1979 that Appellant filed the Contract 
with the County Recorder in the same records that indicated 
that a third party claimed an interest to the Property. (R. at 
54 H 11). At the very latest, Appellant was on notice that he 
should examine the relevant property records in July of 1985, 
when Sweeney allegedly told him that "she was working with her 
attorney and with UDOT to resolve problems with the property, 
so that she could give Thim] a warranty deed to the property." 
(R. at 114 H 6)(emphasis added). In August or September of 
1985, Sweeney refused to talk to Appellant about the Property. 
According to Appellant, she stated at that time that she was 
working with UDOT to resolve problems with the Property. (Id. 
at 114-15 1 7) . 
Plaintiff had constructive notice in 1976 and 1979 
that a third party claimed an interest to the Property. He was 
certainly on notice by late 1985 that there were "problems with 
the Property" that precluded Sweeny from conveying the Property 
under a warranty deed. At the very least, Appellant was on 
notice that he should investigate the status of title to the 
Property. Appellant's failure to act to protect his rights is 
not sufficient ground to claim a bar to the three-year statute 
of limitations for fraud. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
err in concluding that Appellant's fraud claims were time-
barred. 
233\74055 1 
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II. THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
NOR THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT 
TOLLED BY APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER ANY 
ALLEGED INJURY 
Appellant claims that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment because Sweeney was estopped from 
raising the time bar or because the relevant statutes of 
limitations were tolled by Appellant's failure to discover 
Sweeney's alleged breach and fraud. He claims that this 
failure to discover resulted from Sweeney's concealing: (1) her 
conveyance of the deed to the Property to UDOT, as well as her 
assignment of her rights under the Contract; and (2) her 
intentions not to convey the Property to Appellant. 
Appellants arguments are unavailing on at least three 
grounds. First, despite Appellant's protestations to the 
contrary, the undisputed facts show that he was aware of any 
alleged breach by July 1985. Second, any factual consistencies 
are the result, not of Sweeny's representations, but of 
Appellant's inconsistent pleadings and assertions which cannot 
form the basis of estoppel. Finally, Appellant cannot rely 
upon the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations 
because Appellant failed to act reasonably in light of the 
facts contained in his Amended Complaint and other pleadings. 
A. Appellant had actual knowledge of any alleged 
breach of contract or fraud by July 1985 
As discussed above, Appellant was fully aware of any 
alleged breach or fraud in July of 1985. Appellant alleged in 
233\74055 1 
his Amended Complaint that at that point, Sweeney had refused 
to accept payments from or even discuss the Property with him. 
(R. at 54 U 16-17). Appellant affirmed this fact in his 
memorandum in opposition to Sweeney's motion to dismiss. (Id. 
at 99-100, 114-15 %% 6-7). Appellant's tortured argument that 
he did not know of any breach or fraud because Sweeney never 
explicitly said she would not consummate the sale is merely a 
transparent attempt to avoid the statutes of limitations 
applicable to his claims. Because he had actual knowledge of 
any alleged breach of contract or fraud by July 1985, his 
appeal should be denied on this ground. 
B. Appellant cannot raise an estoppel by 
pleading inconsistent facts 
The only inconsistency regarding representations made 
by Sweeney in connection with the Property arise from 
inconsistent facts asserted by Appellant. Appellant may not, 
however, claim estoppel by himself asserting inconsistent 
facts. Kinyon v. Cardon, 686 P.2d 1048, 1052 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 
1984) . 
In his Amended Complaint, Appellant claimed that in 
July 1985, Sweeney refused to accept any payments under the 
Contract or to discuss the Property with Appellant. (R. at 54 
H 16-17). Once Sweeney raised her limitations defense, 
however, Appellant changed his story. In his opposition 
memorandum Appellant claimed that although she would not 
discuss payoff or the Property, she never actually refused an 
233X74055 1 „ ^ 
early payoff. (Id. at 99-100, 114-15 %% 7-8) (emphasis added). 
To the extent that these facts are inconsistent, the 
inconsistency was created not by Sweeney, but by Appellant in 
his attempt to avoid the statutes of limitations. Accordingly, 
Appellant's appeal should be denied on this ground. 
C. The Discovery Rule offers Appellant no 
support because he knew or should have 
known of any alleged breach or fraud before 
the limitations period had run 
Appellant attempts to rely upon the "discovery rule" 
to toll the relevant statutes of limitations until the time he 
claims to have discovered his causes of action. This reliance 
is not well placed, because Appellant knew or should have known 
of his alleged causes of action before the respective 
limitations periods had run, and failed to act reasonably to 
investigate his claim and protect his rights. 
Generally, a cause of action must be brought within 
the relevant limitations period. Statutes of limitations are 
designed "to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Myers v, McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) 
(quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). The 
discovery rule, an exception to this general principle, tolls 
the statute of limitations until the time that plaintiffs 
discover the facts necessary to bring their claims. The Utah 
233X74055 1 
courts have recognized at least three applications of the 
discovery rule: (1) when the rule is mandated by statute; (2) 
when a defendant has concealed the cause of action or otherwise 
misled the plaintiff; and (3) when exceptional circumstance 
would make application of the statue of limitations irrational 
or unjust. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 
(Utah 1992); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 492-93 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Appellant apparently relies upon the "concealment" 
branch of the discovery rule to toll the relevant statutes of 
limitations.2 See (Brief of Appellant at 36-37). Appellant 
claims that Sweeney prevented him from discovering his causes 
of action by concealing the fact that she did not have clear 
title to the Property, by concealing her assignment of the 
Contract and transfer of the property to UDOT, and by 
"continually representing that she would consummate the sale of 
the property to Appellant." Id. These assertions do not bring 
Appellant within the "concealment" branch of the discovery rule 
for at least two reasons. First, Appellant discovered any 
alleged cause of action before the limitations period had 
ended. Second, the discovery rule protects only those 
plaintiff's who act reasonably in protecting their rights. 
2
 There appears to be no statute mandating application 
of the discovery rule in this case. Additionally, Appellant has 
suggested no "exceptional circumstances" that would make the 
application of the statute of limitations irrational or unjust. 
233X74055 1 
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1. Appellant knew of his causes of action 
before limitations period ran 
Even assuming that Sweeney initially concealed her 
breach of contract or fraud, as Appellant alleges, he admits 
that he knew of the breach in March, 1986. (R. at 55 1 19f 101, 
115 H 11). The fact that Appellant learned of Sweeney's 
alleged breach during the limitations period, but failed to 
act, distinguishes this case from every "discovery rule" case 
cited by Appellant, and precludes him from relying upon the 
rule. See Myers, 635 P.2d at 87 (plaintiffs unaware of ward's 
death until limitations period for wrongful death had run); 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) 
(plaintiffs, misled by defendant, did not know cause of injury 
until after period for filing notice of claim expired); Rice v. 
Granite Sch. Dist.. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969) (defendant 
represented it would pay for plaintiffs injuries until after 
limitations period expired); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 
314 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiffs misled by defendant that 
property was sold until after limitations period had run). 
This court has suggested that a plaintiff who becomes 
aware of a cause of action during the limitations period cannot 
rely upon the discovery rule to toll the statute even though 
the cause of action was initially unknown to the plaintiff. 
Butcher, 744 P.2d at 311. In Butcher, the plaintiffs and the 
defendant entered a settlement agreement under which the 
defendant had until April 1976 to sell a parcel of property and 
split the proceeds with the plaintiffs. Although all parties 
attempted to sell the property, it remained unsold in April 
1976. In March 1982, the defendant sold the property without 
notifying the plaintiffs or accounting for their share of the 
proceeds. Unaware of the sale, the plaintiffs continued in 
their attempts to sell the property, and kept the defendant 
apprised of their efforts. Rather than informing the 
plaintiffs that the property had been sold, the defendant 
encouraged them in their efforts. When the plaintiffs 
discovered the sale of the property, they brought an action to 
recover their share of the proceeds. Id. at 812. 
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs would 
generally be required to bring their action within six years of 
the defendant's failure to sell the property in April 1976. 
The court, however, held that because of his conduct and 
misrepresentations, the defendant estopped from asserting the 
statute of limitations. Id. at 314. Significantly, however, 
the Court noted that " [h]ad the [plaintiffs] known of the sale 
of the property in March 1982, [they] could have sued under the 
settlement agreement before their cause of action was barred by 
the six-year statue of limitations." Id.3 
3
 Had the Butcher plaintiffs known of the sale in March, 
1982, they would have had a matter of weeks in which to bring 
suit. In contrast, Appellant had several years from learning of 
Sweeney's transfer of the Property and assignment of the 
Contract to bring his action. 
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Unlike the plaintiffs in Butcher, Appellant concedes 
that he was aware of Sweeney's alleged breach of contract by 
March 1986, well within the limitations period. Nevertheless, 
he failed to bring this action until January 1992, more than 
six-years after the alleged breach, and almost five years after 
Appellant admits that UDOT informed him that the Contract had 
been assigned and the Property transferred to them. The dicta 
in Butcher suggests that Appellant's failure to act to protect 
his rights precludes him from raising an estoppel or from 
relying upon the discovery rule to toll the statute of 
limitations. Consequently, Appellant's appeal should be 
denied. 
2. Appellant cannot rely upon the 
discovery rule to toll the statues of 
limitations because he failed to act 
reasonably to protect his rights 
In order to rely upon the "concealment" branch of the 
discovery rule, Appellant must have acted reasonably to protect 
his rights. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d at 1125, 1130 
(Utah 1992) Appellant must show that a reasonable plaintiff in 
his circumstances would not have brought suit within the 
limitations period. Id. 
The Warren case is instructive. In Warren, the 
plaintiff and his family were injured in the crash of a small 
plane they had leased. After the crash, the plaintiff 
contacted the defendant city to determine whether the lessor of 
the aircraft was insured. Id. at 1128. The defendant did not 
233\74055 1 
return the plaintiff's phone calls or otherwise respond. More 
than a year after the crash, plaintiff again requested 
information regarding the lessor's insurance. At that point, 
the defendant informed the plaintiff that the lessor did not 
have a certificate of insurance on file and had not responded 
to inquiries. The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant 
for failure to enforce a city ordinance requiring airplanes to 
comply with federal regulations. Id. at 1127-28. 
When the defendant raised the statue of limitations 
as a defense, the plaintiff claimed he had been prevented by 
the defendant's concealment from discovering his cause of 
action until after the limitations period. The claimed 
concealment consisted of the defendant's failure to return the 
plaintiff's telephone calls. Id. at 1130. The court held 
that, while a defendant's concealment might under certain 
circumstances constitute estoppel tolling the statute of 
limitations, it does so only when the plaintiff has undertaken 
reasonable efforts to protect its rights. Id. The court noted 
that while the defendant had not returned the plaintiff's 
telephone calls, the plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to 
investigate his cause of action. Consequently, the plaintiff 
could not assert the discovery rule to avoid the statute of 
limitations. Id. 
In the instant case, Appellant undertook no 
reasonable steps to investigate his claims for fraud or breach 
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of contract. He apparently made no investigation of property 
records, even though he claims to have filed the Contract 
there. (R. at 54 1 11). A reasonable purchaser would have 
made such an investigation. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1195-96; 
McConkie, 529 P.2d at 801-02. Moreover, Sweeney allegedly 
refused to accept payments under the Contract and to discuss 
the Property with Appellant because there were "problems with 
the property" that precluded Sweeney's transferring a warranty 
deed to Appellant. (R. at 100, 114-15 %% 6-7). Nevertheless, 
Appellant apparently undertook no efforts to investigate what 
these problems might have been. Even more surprising, when 
Appellant was allegedly informed by UDOT in March 1986, well 
within the limitations period, that Sweeney had assigned the 
Contract and transferred the Property to it, he made no efforts 
to protect his rights. 
Appellant may claim that, unlike the plaintiff in 
Warxen, Sweeney not only concealed Appellant's injury, but 
"continually represented" that she would sell him the Property, 
and that Appellant reasonably relied upon those 
representations. (See Id. at 104; Brief of Appellant at 37). 
This assertion is made, however, only in the unsworn 
allegations of Appellant's brief and memorandum in opposition 
to Sweeney's motion to dismiss. No such allegations appear 
either in Appellant's Amended Complaint, nor in his sworn 
affidavit. Rather, those documents state that after July 1985, 
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Sweeney refused to discuss the Property with Appellant. (R. at 
54 1111 16-17, 114-15 Uf 16-17) . These unsworn allegations 
cannot form the basis of Appellant's assertion of the discovery 
rule. 
Despite numerous facts that would have placed a 
reasonable plaintiff on notice to investigate its claims and 
protect its rights, Appellant undertook no effort to do so 
until January 1992, more than six years after Sweeney's alleged 
breach. Because Appellant failed to act reasonably in 
protecting his rights, he cannot now claim the protection of 
the discovery rule.4 Accordingly, Appellant's appeal should 
be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's arguments that the District Court erred 
in concluding that Appellant brought this action outside the 
applicable statute of limitations are unavailing. Even viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, his causes 
of action arose in July 1985, more than six years before he 
brought this action. Moreover, his argument that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in not applying the discovery 
4
 Appellant has apparently not sought the protection of 
the "exceptional circumstances" branch of the discovery rule. 
This branch would not, however, afford Appellant any relief. A 
plaintiff asserting the discovery rule for exceptional 
circumstances must also show that it acted reasonably in 
investigating its claims and protecting its rights. Warren, 838 
P.2d at 1129. As discussed above, Appellant cannot make such a 
showing. 
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rule to his claim is also without merit. Appellant knew of any 
causes of action within the relevant limitation period. 
Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply. Additionally, 
Appellant cannot rely on any concealment by Sweeney to assert 
the discovery rule, because he failed to act reasonably in 
investigating his claims or protecting his rights. 
Accordingly, Appellant's appeal of the District Court's order 
granting dismissal should be denied. 
DATED this \jCfi— day of April, 1995. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bv WWu-U^yf 
John A. Anderson 
Matthew M. Durham 
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